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I. INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers, judges, law students, and law professors have a love-hate relationship with 
the doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil"l-the idea that shareholders might 
sometimes be personally liable for the debts of the corporation. It is the subject covered 
more than all others in courses on corporation law.2 It is widely litigated, being the 
subject of thousands ofopinions.3 Yet, for all this attention, it is routinely vilified by the 
experts. Most commentators recognize that it is jurisprudence without substance.4 
This would be harmless folly if it were not for the disastrous consequences of veil-
piercing. Indeterminate standards wreak havoc on the life of the lawyer as counselor, a 
• Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the patient attention and 
helpful comments of my colleagues as I presented this paper in faculty colloquia at the University of Florida 
and the University of Kentucky Colleges of Law. 
1. Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited Liability Companies, 
55 MONT. L. REv. 44, 54 {I 994) ("American law governing corporate limited liability bears many attributes of 
a love-hate relationship."). 
2. Professor Robert B. Thompson's recent survey of business associations professors showed that, of7l 
respondents, all taught "veil-piercing." This was not true of any other subject; the next most common topics 
being "formation" and "fiduciary duty." Robert B. Thompson, The Basic Business Associations Course: An 
Empirical Study of Methods and Content, 48 J. LEGAL Eouc. 438,440 (1998). 
3. See generally Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. 
REv. 1036 (199l)(analyzing 1600 reported veil-piercing cases). 
4. See, e.g., William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 
U. PITT. L. REv. 837,850 (1982); Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REv. 979, 982-83 
(1971). 
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fact never mentioned in court cases. Individuals set up corporations, frequently on the 
advice of counsel, with the idea that they will face no personal liability for corporate 
obligations. What counsel does not wince when telling her client that liability is limited 
except in certain unspecified and unpredictable situations when it is not? How do we 
advise clients how much capital is enough, how many formalities must be respected, or 
how fair their conduct must be? Who can be sure what kind of in terrorem effect this 
doctrine has on everyone who studies it? And the madness is spreading. Once confmed to 
corporation law, veil-piercing is expanding wholesale into otherwise analytically pristine 
areas. For example, many courts have imported veil-piercing analysis into cases 
involving limited liability companies (LLCs).5 Many statutes command this result,6 and 
competing "schools" of LLC veil-piercing are already being established.7 Worse yet, the 
expansion continues into areas wholly unrelated to corporation law.8 
The tragedy is that we have created a mess of the common law in the name of 
justice, and it does not have to be so. It is only because we have had the veil-piercing 
doctrine at hand that more principled analysis has gone wanting.9 Despite continuing 
noble attempts to save this doctrine,IO it must be discarded at once. All the "guilty" 
parties can be punished and all the "right" results may be had if we would only substitute 
rigorous analysis in each instance where the incantation of veil-piercing is now made. It 
is as if we are presented with a shelf of well-designed, well-engineered precision tools to 
do the job, but yet we reach for the blunderbuss every time. This Article is an attempt to 
form a basis for rigorous analysis of virtually every veil-piercing case and to rid the law 
of this wandering benevolent imprecision. We are capable of doing the right thing in a 
more coherent fashion, and our colleagues, clients, and the public deserve nothing less. 
In Part II, I review the origins of veil-piercing analysis, demonstrating how the 
erroneous, result-oriented approach to veil-piercing began. In Part III, I review the 
5. See. e.g., Ditty v. Checkrite. Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1335-36 (D. Utah 1997) (citing numerous writers 
who believe the doctrine applies to LLCs). 
6. See Debra Cohen-Whelan, Individual Responsibility in the Wake of Limited Liability, 32 U.S.F. L. 
REv. 335, 348-49 (1998); Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Limited Liability in the New Limited Liability 
Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. I, 17 (1997). 
7. See David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should 
Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility, and Securities 
Regulation for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 427, 455-59 (1998) (discussing various 
scholars' approaches). 
8. See infra Part 111.0. 
9. In his assault on the "de facto corporation" doctrine almost 50 years ago, Professor Frey observed in 
language applicable to the current problem: 
[Wjhen a judge is officially asked to determine whether or not certain defendants are personally 
liable, it does not suffice for him merely to declare, with or without resort to Latin, that the 
defendants are or are not so liable. The parties and their attorneys and the legal profession are 
properly interested in the real reasoning upon which the judge arrived at his conclusion. 
Alexander Hamilton Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1153, 1169 (1952). 
10. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion 
Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REv. 853 (1997); John H. Matheson & 
Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An 
Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners' Limited-Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. REv. 147 
(2000). 
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modem analysis which attempts to fully "unpack"ll veil-piercing into its constituent 
parts. In Part IV, I propose that modern analysis can adequately explain all cases, and 
critically examine the faulty invocation of equity as a heritage and a means for deciding 
the cases otherwise unexplainable. In Part V, I attempt to explain why veil-piercing 
persists despite its universal derision, and how its demise might be hastened, principally 
by law professors. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF VEIL-PIERCING ANALYSIS 
According to Stephen Presser's history of the subject,12 veil-piercing as a doctrine 
dates from three events in the fIrst third of the century: Maurice Wormser's works on the 
subject from 1912 to 1927,13 Judge Benjamin Cardozo's 1926 opinion in Berkey v. Third 
Avenue Railway Co., 14 and Frederick Powell's 1931 book on parent and subsidiary 
corporations. I 5 There was even some debate, in the beginning, of whether "veil-piercing" 
or "disregard of the corporation" is the most appropriate name for the analysis. Wormser 
shifted between the two terms in his writing, attributing the origin of the "veil" analogy to 
one court's analysis of an early U.S. Supreme Court case.16 Powell suggests that "veil-
piercing" is a better caption than "disregard," because it shows that shareholder liability 
for corporate obligations is imposed on a one-time-only basis. 17 However, this distinction 
between permanent and temporary disregard of the corporate form is not self-evident. 
The very term veil-piercing seems more suggestive of the result, implying from the outset 
that the corporation or other limited-liability vehicle is a sham, as a veil hides reality. In 
this light, the term "disregard of the corporate entity" appears more neutral, and some 
scholars prefer it. 18 
Wormser's analysis of veil-piercing in 1912 began as a quest to determine what the 
corporation is as a "juristic concept."19 Although he recognized at the outset that 
II. This imagery comes from Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious 
Liability of Corporate Participants for the Torts Enterprise, 47 V AND. L. REv. I (1994). 
12. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL §§ 1.03[2]-[4], at 1-21 to 1-37 (1998). 
13. See generally I. MAURICE WORMSER, THE DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED 
CORPORATE PROBLEMS (I 927}. Wormser's book is, except for the first chapter, a collection of law review 
articles previously published between 1912 and 1918. Id. at v, 42, 86,101,120,142,170. Hereafter, I will cite 
to those articles rather than their reprinted forms, and to the book only in reference to the previously 
unpublished first chapter. 
14. ISS N.E. 58 (N.Y. I 926). 
IS. FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF A PARENT 
CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY (1931). There were earlier sightings, the most 
frequently mentioned being United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 
I 90S). 
16. I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of the Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REv. 496, 498 (l912). 
This article bears the "veil-piercing" title, but his later book compiling this and other subjects was captioned in 
the "disregard of the fiction" mode, suggesting that at least he thought that "disregard" was a larger subject than 
"veil-piercing." See generally WORMSER, supra note 13. 
17. POWELL, supra note IS, § I, at 1-2 & n.2 (claiming veil-piercing as "the more accurate expression," 
but noting (even in 1931) that "it is now too late to quarrel with the universal terminology [of disregarding the 
corporate entity] found in the judicial opinions."}. How surprised Powell would be to find "veil-piercing" the 
predominant label for this doctrine today. 
18. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 256-57 (6th ed. 1998). 
19. Wormser, supra note 16, at 496. 
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determining the "true anatomy of the corporate concept" was a "tempting but profitless
discussion," 20 he then posed the following magic question:
When should the concept of corporate entity be adhered to, when should it be
disregarded? The concept is not an "open sesame," which will open all gates.
When to use it, when to ignore it, is the present day dilemma. The scope and
purpose of this article is to seek to supply an answer and to indicate in what
classes of cases the "entity concept" should be ignored; incidentally, to
demonstrate how the courts, again and again, have frustrated each and every
attempt to commit iniquity, to perpetrate fraud, to achieve monopoly, or to
accomplish wrongs, under the guise, and hiding behind the veil, of corporate
existence. 2 1
Wormser then proceeded to examine cases in each of these categories. First, he
turned to cases which, under modem analysis, would be considered fraudulent transfer
cases.22 Indeed, he described these cases as "instances of judicial impatience with all
attempts to hamper, delay or defraud creditors" 2 3 perhaps ignorant of the origin of this
turn of speech-the Statute of Elizabeth, 24 the ancestor of modem fraudulent transfer
law.25
Next, Wormser examined cases arising under various business regulation statutes,
particularly antitrust cases, 26 all of which could be explained by resort to the words and
policies of the statutes at hand. Finally, he examined miscellaneous cases, the most
interesting of which for our purposes are those such as modem day "promoter's" cases,
where a promoter engages in fraud or self-dealing with the corporation and then passes
the stock on to innocent purchasers. 2 7 Such cases remain a difficult subject today, but are
not approached using veil-piercing analysis. 28 Wormser then laid down what he called
the "general" rule:
When the conception of corporate entity is employed to defraud creditors, to
evade an existing obligation, to circumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate
20. Id.
21. Id. at 496-97.
22. See id. at 498-506.
23. Id. at 498.
24. 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1570). The original statute provided in part for the avoidance of:
(Fleigned, covinous and fraudulent feoffnents, gifts, grants, alienations, conveyances, bonds,
suits, judgments and executions, as well of lands and tenaments as of goods and chattels....
which... have been and are devised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin, collusion or guile, to
the end, purpose and intent, to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others of their just and
lawful actions....
Id. (emphasis added).
25. PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS 1-15 (1989) ("The Statute of 13
Elizabeth ... is the source of fraudulent disposition law in this country.").
26. See Wormser, supra note 16, at 507-13.
27. See id. at 513-15. The most in-depth discussion is of Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 93 N.W. 1024
(Neb. 1903), a case involving fraud akin to that described in the text, where the court held that a corporation has
no equitable claim if none of the shareholders have such a claim. Barber, 93 N.W. at 1031.
28. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 715-19 (1986) (describing current judicial analysis of
promotors' fraud cases).
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monopoly, or to protect knavery or crime, the courts will draw aside the web of
entity, will regard the corporate company as an association of live, up-and-
doing, men and women shareholders, and will do justice between real
persons.2 9
He noted later in his 1927 book that this formulation probably was not a true rule.
Indeed, he claimed the concept of disregard of the corporate fiction was ultimately
incapable of precise statement because of the many forms it takes.30 In this fashion, then,
with a summary of cases transferred to an amorphous doctrine, the confusion was first
born.
Next upon the scene was Judge Cardozo in Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co.,31 a
tort case involving injury by employees of a corporation, which was in turn a wholly-
owned subsidiary of another corporation.32 The court refused to disregard the separate
existence of the subsidiary; Cardozo seized upon the fact that such a combination would
be illegal under the New York laws governing street railways. 33 Wormser chastised
Cardozo's opinion as being too slavish to regularity, that is, to the rule of law, and
insufficiently flexible to reach the right result when needed. 34 Presser characterized
Cardozo's reasoning as circular, moving from imprecision to precise rule and back to
imprecision again.35 But the opinion stood, despite the holding, as an endorsement of the
general veil-piercing concept, though famously "enveloped in the mists of metaphor." 36
Cardozo cautioned against using metaphor too broadly, but its use might be necessary, he
cautioned, to defend or uphold "some accepted public policy" or where to do otherwise
would "work a fraud upon the law."3 7
Of the three scholars, Powell, in his 1931 book, is probably most frequently credited
with creating and neatly packaging the veil-piercing doctrine. Although technically his
work deals only with parent and subsidiary corporations, he freely extended his analysis
to "one-man" corporations, indicating the rules applied to those entities "with equal
force." 3 8 He stated it would be an "abuse of the privilege" or, using Cardozo's phrase, "a
fraud upon the law" 39 to allow the separate existence of a corporation to be recognized if
the following were true: (1) there was control of the corporation, (2) used to commit
29. Wormser, supra note 16, at 517.
30. In respect of his earlier work, Wormser wrote:
I am older and less wise-far less wise. I have learned to realize that the formulation of legal
propositions which can be applied with meticulous exactitude is a highly dangerous undertaking.
You cannot bind up legal principles with baby blue ribbon in orderly little parcels and label them
"thus and thus" or "so and so."
WORMSER, supra note 13, at 40.
31. 155 N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1926).
32. Id. at 58.
33. Id. at 59-60. Presser vividly and aptly characterizes Cardozo's use of this "obscure" statute as a deus
ex machina. PRESSER, supra note 12, § 1.03[2], at 1-23 to 1-24.
34. WORMSER, supra note 13, at 23.
35. PRESSER, supra note 12, § 1.03[2], at 1-24 to 1-26.
36. Berkey, 155 N.E. at 61.
37. Id.
38. POWELL, supra note 15, § 11, at 37.
39. POWELL, supra note 15, § 1, at 2. As to the source of this phrase "a fraud upon the law," see supra text
accompanying note 37.
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"fraud or wrong," causing (3) unjust loss or injury to the complainant. 40 Powell's three-
part test is the one now most frequently used as the touchstone for veil-piercing
analysis.4 1
Ill. MODERN VEIL-PIERCING ANALYSIS
Veil-piercing as a doctrine was not upon the scene very long before legal scholars
began careful analysis. First, it was recognized that veil-piercing cases could be
productively analyzed if divided by the type of case or plaintiff. Then, different groups
took on each different category. This part discusses each of these developments in turn.
A. The Origin of Categorization by Type of Case
The trend toward principled analysis probably began with Alexander Hamilton
Frey's 1951 discussion of defective incorporation.42 Although not directly relevant to the
veil-piercing issue,43 Frey's empirical work, coupled with an atcempt to provide
explanations of the compiled results, provides two important insights. First, he cleaved
the cases between those where the plaintiff dealt "on a corporate basis" with the
purported corporation, and those where the plaintiff did not so deal.44 This was the
beginning of the separation of "contract plaintiffs" and "tort plaintiffs" that would later
emerge, although Frey pointed out that most of the plaintiffs not dealing with the
purported corporation "on a corporate basis" were short-term creditors and not tort
victims. 4 5 Second, Frey exposed the circular reasoning of using the result as explanation
or doctrine. Searching for deeper meaning where there was none on the surface, he
warned, was likely to be futile. In this regard, he stated:
One can ponder upon so-called policy considerations which, although not
articulate in the opinions, may have been latent in the judicial mind. But such
speculations do not appeal to me as particularly profitable. In arguing a
particular case and commenting on prior decisions one may offer "good"
reasons for or against certain judgments, even though these may not be the
"real" reasons which induced the results. This, however, is largely a matter of
personal opinion, unless there is a body of data from which substantiating
40. POWELL, supra note 15, § 3, at 4-6.
41. See, e.g., Bahls, supra note 1, at 61; Rutheford B Campbell, Limited Liability for Corporate
Shareholders: Myth or Matter-of-Fact, 63 KY. L.J. 23, 33 (1975); Debra Cohen-Whelan, Individual
Responsibility in the Wake of Limited Liability, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 335, 347 (1998); Thompson, supra note 6, at
9 n.37 (citing I WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 43.10 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1990)).
42. See Frey, supra note 9, at 1153.
43. But see Fred S. McChesney, Doctrinal Analysis and Statistical Modeling in Law: The Case of
Defective Incorporation, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 493, 508 & n.48 (1993) (discussing apparent confluence of
defective incorporation and veil-piercing doctrines as noted by several writers).
44. Frey, supra note 9, at 1157 &n.18.
45. Id. at 1160. Frey's analysis has been criticized for not also recognizing as a dispositive factor "whether
the defendants had taken reasonable steps to incorporate and reasonably believed they were incorporated."
Norwood P. Beveridge, Corporate Puzzles: Being a True and Complete Explanation of De Facto Corporations
and Corporations by Estoppel, Their Historical Development, Attempted Abolition, and Eventual
Rehabilitation, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 935, 963 (1997).
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support may be drawn. The fact remains that... the courts have rarely given
either real reasons or good reasons, despite the emptiness of the ... doctrine
upon which they verbally rely.46
Frey's analysis has been criticized47 and his predictions about the demise of the defacto
corporation doctrines have not come to pass, but these basic points remain important
nonetheless for our study of the development of modem veil-piercing doctrine.
Robert Hamilton's 1971 article48 carried this careful look beyond empty doctrine
into the veil-piercing area. His indictment of the doctrine is swift and sure: "The sheer
breadth of this [veil-piercing doctrine] renders it almost totally useless."4 9 He followed
with three important observations intended to sharpen veil-piercing analysis. First,
individual liability under traditional theories, such as agency or tort law, requires no
additional veil-piercing verbiage, which becomes merely confusion masquerading as
substance. 50 Second, the tort-contract distinction is important, because results do and
should turn in many cases on whether the plaintiff dealt voluntarily with the
corporation. 5 1 Finally, he noted as relevant, an appeal to general equity or fairness in
attempting to deal with entrepreneurs who play too fast and loose with the division of
assets of the enterprise into several entities.5 2
Each of these points is an important advance in veil-piercing analysis. First, it is
critical to remember the astonishingly simple rules of individual liability. A defrauder is
liable for his fraud whether committed with the aid of a business entity or not. A
servant's tort redounds to his master, but this does not relieve the servant of liability.
53
Second, the separation of cases into voluntary and involuntary groups is important,
although the tort and contract labels can be misleading. For example, notions of fraud can
move seamlessly between these two substantive areas. The level of voluntariness of a
given plaintiff in dealing with a corporation is best represented on a continuum, with the
sophisticated, hard-bargaining lender on one end, and the incidental, accidental tort
victim on the other, and trade creditors, fraud victims and a variety of others somewhere
in between. Finally, it is important to remember that where notions of fairness are
involved, the issue at hand is one of some other substantive body of law:
Courts are likely to avoid answers that lead to results that are unfair or
inconsistent with the court's view of policy. ... These notions of fairness and
justice often have little or nothing to do with corporation law; rather, they
46. Frey, supra note 9, at 1179-80.
47. See, e.g., Beveridge, supra note 45, at 935; McChesney, supra note 43, at 493; Wayne N. Bradley,
Comment, An Empirical Study of Defective Incorporation, 39 EMORY L.J. 523 (1990).
48. Hamilton, supra note 4, at 979.
49. Id. at 982.
50. Id. at 983.
51. Id. at 984-85.
52. Id. at 985. This latter observation was cleverly restated by Hamilton as follows: "Perhaps the rule of
these cases should be that the use of a corporation as a 'cunning device' is prohibited." Hamilton, supra note 4,
at 1003.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219, 343 (1958) (liability of master and servant,
respectively).
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belong to the substantive law of torts or contracts or insurance, or what have
you. This again emphasizes the ends to which analysis should be directed.
54
This already suggests that much of what courts deal with in the name of veil-piercing is
actually only ordinary, albeit mislabeled, analysis in some other substantive fashion. I
will discuss each of Frey's and Hamilton's groups-contract and tort cases-in turn.
B. Contract Cases
In contract cases, "contract plaintiffs" are those with voluntary claims against the
corporation. In general, courts state they will remit contract plaintiffs to the bargain
struck, but that certain unfair conduct will not be permitted.5 5 However, Robert Clark in
197756 observed that, in many of these cases, fraudulent transfer law served the same
purpose as veil-piercing, but was a better developed and more precise doctrine. 57 All of
the conduct condemned in veil-piercing cases with contract plaintiffs-fraud, conduct
akin to fraud, diversion of assets, and self-dealing-is already dealt with in fraudulent
transfer law.5 8
One important difference is the nature of the remedy, as Clark observed.5 9 The
remedy for a fraudulent transfer is ordinarily disregard of the transfer or recovery of the
property transferred (or its value) from the transferee.6 0 In veil-piercing cases, however,
courts may be overwhelmed by the transfers made and find them difficult to trace or
identify with precision. The remedy given-personal liability for all the debts-might in
some cases exceed that available under fraudulent transfer law. Clark contends that this
"shotgun remedy" is "more biased toward a punitive result."'6 1 Nonetheless, this broader,
more punitive remedy could nonetheless be justified if the conduct of the defendant
amounted to actual fraud, as it does in many cases. There, the measure of damage would
not be the property transferred away, but the harm caused by the defendant's
misrepresentation(s), 62 which is more likely to match the plaintiffs losses where the
transfers are numerous or difficult to trace. None of this is often discussed in veil-
piercing opinions, of course, since courts are as likely to ignore the defendant's direct
liability 63 as they are to ignore the possible application of fraudulent transfer laws.
A final problem with this theory is that fraudulent transfer law requires, of course, a
transfer of assets from the corporation. Therefore, it does not deal with the problem of
initial inadequate capitalization. Clark observed that courts have developed the so-called
54. Hamilton, supra note 4, at 1008 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 984.
56. Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 540-53
(1977).
57. Id. at 505-06.
58. See id. at 541.
59. See id. at 547-50.
60. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 9-10, 7A (pt. II) U.L.A. 2, 198-99, 257 (1999); UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 7-8, 7A (pt. 11) U.L.A. 274, 339-40, 351-52 (1999).
61. Clark, supra note 56, at 547.
62. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed.
1984).
63. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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agency or instrumentality theory64 to step in where fraudulent transfer doctrines do not
really apply. While not explicitly criticizing that theory, Clark observed that the factors
relevant under it-commingling of assets, lack of observance of formalities, and the
like-"are, upon analysis, singularly lacking in direct relevance to the question of the
existence, and the amount, of harm caused the outside creditor by the misbehavior of the
controlling shareholder." 65 In his later reprise of the same theories, 66 Clark observed that
extension of veil-piercing beyond fraudulent transfer law analogies would be an
experiment "with the notion of placing upon business creditors an affirmative duty of
cooperation with creditors." 67
C. Tort Cases
The experiment foreseen by Clark soon began in earnest, as scholars began dealing
with the other large and more analytically troubling group--the involuntary claimants,
almost always called tort plaintiffs or tort cases.6 8 The initial conceptual stumbling block,
is that by definition there can be no misrepresentation to, or reliance by, involuntary
plaintiffs. Therefore, any discussion of fraud, or even of undercapitalization couched in
reliance or expectation terms, does nothing to advance the analysis here. 69 Courts'
attempts to deal with this problem by means of the instrumentality or "alter ego"
doctrine, as previously discussed, have been disappointing primarily because the courts
look at factors wholly irrelevant to the cause of the plaintiff s injury.70
Ending the inquiry here is also unsatisfying. "[A]lmost every commentator has
paused to note that limited liability cannot be satisfactorily justified for tort victims ...
and then moved on as though there is nothing to do about this unfortunate wrinkle in the
economic perfection of the law."7 1 Robert Thompson's 1994 analysis of tort liability72
recognized that traditional veil-piercing analysis is primarily focused on contract
plaintiffs.7 3 Justification or motivation for extending veil-piercing to tort plaintiffs can be
found in the desire to create incentives to avoid injury-causing behavior or to allocate
risks to those more able to bear them.74 Although certain basic economic arguments can
64. Clark, supra note 56. at 552-53. Clark used as the basis for his discussion the famous veil-piercing
case of Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966).
65. Clark, supra note 56, at 553.
66. CLARK, supra note 28, at 71-81.
67. Id. at 81. He continued: "But as the near absence of cases basing veil-piercing solely on inadequate
initial capitalization suggests, courts have not gone very far toward accepting this notion." Id.
68. The "tort" label is not meant to be suggestive of a result; indeed, the discussion below examines
whether there should be tort liability at all. The term is used here, as most scholars do, to differentiate the
voluntariness of the plaintiff's dealings with the corporation. Id. The tort group might include many trade
creditors. See Clark, supra note 56, at 543; supra Part II.A.
69. Reliance is an essential element of an actionable misrepresentation-a fundamental, but often
forgotten point. KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, § 105, at 728.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
71. David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1601
(1991).
72. Thompson, supra note 11, at 1.
73. Id. at 16-17 ("Piercing the corporate veil, the principal legal vehicle used to restrict limited liability,
has been described as concerned primarily with fraudulent conveyance law, and the great majority of piercing
cases arise in a bargain setting.").
74. Id. at 14.
2000]
The Journal of Corporation Law
be made for extending liability to shareholders of even publicly-traded corporations for
torts committed by the corporation,75 Thompson notes that such rules could be avoided
by an efficient market developing other investment instruments, and is, in any event, not
"consistent with the prevailing law in the corporate area, nor are the arguments likely to
better serve tort purposes."
76
One possible solution, discussed by few writers but worthy of further exploration, is
to deal with tort plaintiffs with tort law, that is, to recognize, or at least discuss, a duty to
adequately capitalize the corporation. This duty, according to this theory, would be
imposed on the controlling shareholders or managers77 to make adequate assets available
for doing business.7 8 This is a novel theory, to be sure, but deserves closer examination.
The advantages of this duty to capitalize theory over the existing alter ego doctrine
are numerous. First, consider the basis of liability. It is not some manufactured duty to
follow corporate formalities, or impart to the corporation some fictional separate
existence. Rather, the basis of liability would be determined according to questions of tort
policy as applied to the facts at hand. As between this plaintiff and this defendant, who is
better able to bear the loss? Would making the defendant liable for inadequate
capitalization deter formation of "shell" corporations? Is the defendant better suited to
determine the extent of risk and to insure against it, either individually or through the
corporation? These are the central questions in a tort analysis, 79 but are examined, if at
all, only in a cursory fashion by courts using the veil-piercing doctrine.
In addition, explicit consideration of a duty to sufficiently capitalize would make
clear other issues left unresolved by current doctrine. First, the measure of damages
should follow the breach of duty, so the defendant's liability should be capped at the
lesser of the amount of the plaintiff's injury or the level of capital deemed adequate or
reasonable. This addresses the problem of windfall damages under the veil-piercing
doctrine. 80 Second, courts would be required for the first time to explicitly focus in this
context on the proper amount of capital to be devoted to the business enterprise. The
resulting case law would be enormously helpful to lawyers advising clients on
incorporation. The inquiry is new in this context, but neither unprecedented nor difficult.
75. In this area, Thompson discusses primarily the works of Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991), and Joseph A.
Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387
(1992). See Thompson, supra note 1I, at 30-31. Although discussion of unlimited liability as a rule is
captivating and thoughtful, it is not considered a realistic possibility. See William J. Rands, Domination of a
Subsidiary by a Parent, 32 IND. L. REV. 421, 430 (1999). 1 leave that discussion to others.
76. Thompson, supra note 11, at 30.
77. There is normally complete overlap between these groups in a closely-held corporation. As to parent
and subsidiary corporations, control can be more difficult to evaluate, see Rands, supra note 75, at 433-48, but
the theory here remains the same. See id. at 456 (supporting the requirement that the subsidiary have "a realistic
potential for profitability").
78. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE
L.J. 857, 872-76 (1984); Leebron, supra note 71, at 1633.
79. See Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs,
70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 892 & n.65 (1982).
80. See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 990. Suppose that a corporation has no available assets, the plaintiff has
suffered $1 million in injury, and it is agreed that $100,000 would be a reasonable amount of capital. The
defendant's personal liability should be only $100,000, whereas under the veil-piercing doctrine the defendant
would be personally liable for the entire $1 million.
[Fall
To KnowA Veil
It is clear, for example, that the focus should be on equity, that is, net assets after the
claims of prior creditors. 8 1 Liability insurance should undoubtedly also be considered
capital. 82 The ability of the enterprise to pay its claims out of future earnings should be
important,83 although this is less likely to be a factor with large, unanticipated injuries of
the type frequently encountered in veil-piercing tort cases. 84
A further advantage of tort analysis based on failure to adequately capitalize the
corporation is that it focuses exclusively on the one factor-the net assets of the
corporation-that is most logically related to the plaintiffs injury. Current veil-piercing
doctrine relies on a list of factors to get beyond the conclusory and content-free rule.8 5
The list is indeterminate both in length and in the conclusiveness of each factor. 8 6
However, most writers pare the list down to two broad categories-undercapitalization
and some variation of failure to follow corporate formalities. 87 Of these two,
undercapitalization is the only one with any legitimate claim to any causal connection to
the plaintiff's injury. The fact that no meetings of officers or directors were held, minutes
not kept, stock not subscribed, and so forth, is clearly irrelevant. Closer would be the fact
that personal and corporate assets were intermingled, but only if it shows that corporate
assets were wrongly diverted, as in the fraudulent transfer scenario already discussed.
Separation of a single economic unit into different parts,8 8 famously dealt with at least in
81. See, for example, UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2)(i), 7A (pt. II) U.L.A. 274, 301 (1999),
which refers to the "assets" of the business, comprised only of nonexempt assets not subject to prior lien. Bruce
A. Markell, Toward True and Plain Dealing: A Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small
Capital, 21 IND. L. REV. 469, 486 (1988). Others have advocated placing tort plaintiffs prior to existing
creditors. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 28, at 79; Christopher M. Painter, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured
Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1984), Andrew Price, Note, Tort
Creditor Superpriority and Other Proposed Solutions to Corporate Limited Liability and the Problem of
Externalities, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 439,462-70 (1995).
82. See Leebron, supra note 71, at 1635; see also Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 309-10
(8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 908 (1993) (equating "capital" with "financial responsibility," and
concluding that liability insurance should count as capital in this context). Of course, the adequacy and
availability of the insurance, as well as the ability of the carrier to pay the claim, are all relevant. See id. at 309;
Autrey v. 22 Texas Services, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 735, 745 (S.D. Tex. 2000). And some ratios of insurance
might be adequate for small companies, but not for large ones. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment
Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413, 1421-22 (1998) (using an example of "adequate insurance" for a
small firm that seems ridiculously low for a public company).
83. See Markell, supra note 81, at 496.
84. See, e.g., Autrey, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 744 (rejecting the argument that liabilities could be met out of
business earnings where corporations had nominal net assets).
85. See supra text accompanying note 40.
86. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES 347 & n.18 (3d ed. 1983) (citing Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., Inc., 283 N.W.2d
509, 512 (Minn. 1979), which lists eight factors); Campbell, supra note 41, at 36-37; Thompson, supra note 3,
at 1063; Eric Fox, Note, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Entities, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1155 &
n.91 (1994) (citing Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 98-99 (W. Va. 1986), which lists 19 factors).
87. See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 985; Matheson & Eby, supra note 10, at 173-81; Thompson, supra note
3, at 1063. Other longer lists, when shom of conclusory factors such as instrumentality, alter ego, control and
the like, can be pared down to these essential two. A leading treatise refuses to compile any such list, simply
noting that "[s]hareholder[s] .. . might be personally liable where formalities are not substantially observed,
initial financing was not adequate, etc." HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 86, at 349 (emphasis added).
88. See Campbell, supra note 41, at 42 (discussing the practice of"[s]plitting a single economic enterprise
into smaller corporate units"); Hamilton, supra note 4, at 992.
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law school by various taxicab cases,89 comes closer still. But they are all proxies for one
thing-that the corporate defendant is left with insufficient assets.
The one slightly revolutionary aspect of this theory is the free-wheeling treatment of
causation, normally a central element of tort liability. The causal connection between the
defendant's actions-undercapitalization-and the plaintiffs injury is tenuous, though
better than current doctrine's reliance on maintenance of corporate formalities and even
more remotely relevant acts. But tenuous causal connections are nothing new in tort law,
which recognizes similar causes of action and considers remote, though extant, causation
to be sufficient.90 The causation issue is simpler still if we look at the plaintiffs injury
not as the physical harm suffered, but as the inability to recover from the corporation on
his or her claim. Although this makes the cause more direct, it creates a broader duty. But
this, too, is nothing new; it is nothing less (or more) than the classic Palsgraf problem.
9 1
Such a broad duty was advocated by Judge Andrews, dissenting in Palsgraf,92 and by
Judge Keating, dissenting in Walkovsky v. Carlton,93 a veil-piercing case with perhaps a
stature equal to Palsgraf. In Walkovsky, the New York Court of Appeals held that
inadequate capitalization alone was an insufficient basis for piercing the corporate veil.
But Keating argued that the defendants should be obliged to "organize [their corporation]
with capital [sufficient] to meet liabilities which are certain to arise in the ordinary course
of the corporation's business."94 In both cases, there would exist a "duty to the world,"
into whose breach a random plaintiff would later step. Prosser and Keeton's criticism of
Andrews' approach in Palsgrafwould apply equally to Keating's approach in Walkovsky:
A key difficulty with this position is that it proves too much. Unlimited liability
is plainly unjustified, and this approach does nothing to solve the problem of a
place to stop short of infinite liability. It throws the question of any limitation
back into the morass of "proximate cause"....
The real problem, and the one to which attention should be directed, would
seem to be one of social policy: whether the defendants in such cases should
bear the heavy negligence losses of a complex civilization, rather than the
individual plaintiff... So far as policy is concerned, different answers might
89. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 86, at 349 n.25.
90. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DE PAUL L. REv. 435, 442-43 (1999). This is distinct from a
like-sounding but very different problem, dealing with liability when even cause-in-fact cannot be proved. See,
e.g., Delgado, supra note 79. See generally Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735,
1813-26 (1985).
91. The reference is, of course, to Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928)
("Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do."). See KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, at 284-86.
92. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, at 285 (quoting Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 102-03 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting)).
93. 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966).
94. Id. at 14 (Keating, J., dissenting). Also usually considered as a similar case is Minton v. Cavaney, 364
P.2d 473 (Cal. 1961), in which the California Supreme Court declared that shareholders are liable "when they
provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate in the conduct of corporate affairs." Minton, 364 P.2d
at 475 (citations ommitted). Often forgotten is that the court in Minton held only that the defendant was
permitted to relitigate the issue of the corporation's negligence. Minton, 364 P.2d, at 476. In addition, tort
policy concepts were important to the Minton court, which concluded after reviewing the facts that the
corporation's capital "was trifling compared with the business to be done and the risks of loss." Minton, 364
P.2d at 475 (quoting Automotriz Del Golfo De California S.C. De C.V. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1,4 (Cal. 1957)).
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well be given in different communities, according to the view that is taken as to
where the loss should fall; but the issue is not to be determined by any talk of
"duty" or an assumption of the conclusion.
95
Therefore, the problem, if we cast it as one of "duty," is no more or less intractable than
if we cast it as one of "causation." It is clear how to solve this problem of an involuntary
plaintiff versus an undercapitalized corporation if we do so with the tools of tort law and
its twin aims of compensation and deterrence in mind. Embracing the "social policy"
issues envisioned by Prosser and Keeton is satisfying analysis, regardless of the ultimate
conclusion reached in an individual case, and regardless of the eternal question of
whether the real issue is one of duty or causation. 96 But attempting to solve this problem
with the tools of corporation law yields clumsy discussions of duty to follow formalities,
to keep corporate funds separate from personal funds, and the like. These are clumsy
because they are an attempt to "dress up" the obligation to capitalize with other
obligations that bear no conceivable relationship to the loss suffered by the plaintiff.
97
One final aspect of this duty to adequately capitalize is important-identification of
the proper plaintiff. Surely this action should be available only to the involuntary
creditors,9 8 otherwise the law will substantially rewrite the contracts between the
corporation and its creditors, as well as much of fraudulent transfer law. However, this
should not be a large problem now that we have properly cast the action as one sounding
in tort. Voluntary creditors can be separated and remitted, as they currently are, to their
own vigilance. 99 In the tort cases, application of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence rules will limit claims, or the doctrine could simply be developed as one only
available to involuntary creditors.
D. Other Cases
The remaining cases involving personal liability for corporate debts or obligations
grow not out of tort or contract, but primarily from some other statutory foundation
substantively regulating the conduct in which the corporation engages. 100 Not
surprisingly, the question as to whether the corporate veil should be pierced is best
answered according to the dictates of the statute in question, 10 1 although an overarching
95. KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, at 287-88.
96. See Wright, supra note 90, at 1738-39.
97. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT AND OTHER
COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 163 (1987)
("[Vlery special pressures in tort require a different treatment than cases arising in other areas of law, such as
contract. In the process, tort law principles will inevitably receive primary consideration.").
98. This may pose some problem when dealing with cases on the margin, where the level of voluntariness
is low, such as trade creditors or employees. See supra note 45 and accompanying text, and supra Part III.A
(discussing varying levels of voluntariness).
99. See Hamilton, supra note 4, at 984-85.
100. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1058. In addition to tort, contract, and statutory cases, Thompson
reports a small number of criminal cases, 15 out of a total of 1572 cases (as indicated in Table Nine). Id.
101. See H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 18 (1998) (noting that the statute at issue there "mandates a degree of involvement in the
subsidiary's operations that may be viewed as being antithetical to the corporate separateness necessary to
insulate the parent from liability arising from the crimes of the subsidiary"); Hamilton, supra note 4, at 997-98;
Thompson, supra note 3, at 1062; see also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
2000]
The Journal of Corporation Law
concern with direct participation by owners has been found in cases arising under
different kinds of statutes. 10 2 There is no guarantee, of course, that the statutory purpose
will always be clear, but the analysis will be better when done in the statutory context
than by looking at the artificial, veil-piercing factors. 103
Professors Blumberg and Strasser, in their six-part treatise on corporate groups,
predicted the demise of reliance on veil-piercing when questions arise under state or
federal statutes. 10 4 However, recent cases have suggested otherwise, looking initially at
veil-piercing and then finding statutory analysis unnecessary. 10 5 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has sanctioned application of veil-piercing principles in addition to
analysis of liability under substantive statutory law. 10 6 So it seems that even with an
adequate statutory basis at hand, courts still refer to veil-piercing principles as somehow
relevant.
IV. How To MAKE GOOD LAW WITH HARD CASES
The analyses summarized in Part III provide ample tools to decide veil-piercing
cases in a principled fashion. This part details how those decisions should be made, and
deals with the troublesome uncertainty that remains.
A. Analysis by Type of Case
From Part III, we see that modem veil-piercing analysis has created at least three
types of cases, sorted primarily according to the plaintiff's cause of action. In contract
cases, the decision to hold individuals liable for corporate obligations is akin to, or
identical to, fraudulent transfer analysis. In tort cases, the decision should be based on a
duty (or absence of a duty) to provide adequate equity capital for the business. Finally, in
cases arising under various regulatory statutes, the decision should turn on the policies
underlying the statutory scheme at hand.
PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GENERAL APPLICATION
66 (1989) (noting that traditional veil-piercing analysis "seems fundamentally ill-suited for use in determining
the application of federal statutes. Nevertheless ... most courts do not proceed solely in terms of statutory
analysis but instead rely on 'piercing the veil,' either in whole or in part."). Traditional veil-piercing and a
statutory analysis can be combined by recalling that one of the premises for veil-piercing was "frustration of
legislative purpose." United States v. Clinical Leasing Serv., Inc., 982 F.2d 900, 901 (5th Cir. 1992).
102. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 24-29.
103. See Harvey Gelb, CERCLA Versus Corporate Limited Liability, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 11, 125-27
(1999).
104. See BLUMBERG, supra note 101, at xlv ("The law is undergoing a process of development with entity
[veil-piercing] law increasingly yielding when it creates an obstacle to implementation of the underlying
policies of the law."); PHILIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATE STATUTORY LAW xxxvi (1995)
(describing as "relatively infrequent" state decisions invoking veil-piercing principles in cases arising under a
statute).
105. See, e.g., United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138, 143 (6th Cir. 1993); Clinical Leasing Serv., Inc.,
982 F.2d at 904 n.8. But see Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1335-37 (D. Utah 1997) (extending the
same veil-piercing analysis to limited liability companies and also finding personal liability under the applicable
statute).
106. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-64 (discussing veil-piercing), 64-73 (discussing
statutory application) (1998).
[Fall
To Know A Veil
It is important to step back and observe at this point how far we have strayed from
anything involving what is typically called "corporate law." Although the question of
individual liability for corporate torts may involve some of the same issues implicated in
directors' and officers' duty of care cases, 10 7 the question is not one of duty to
shareholders or even creditors, but to plaintiffs who are the designated beneficiaries of
the regulatory scheme. Our modem analysis of veil-piercing has nothing to do with
corporation law, other than it involves a corporation. We pose the question-"when
should an individual shareholder be liable for a corporate obligation?"--as if there were
to ever be a coherent doctrinal answer. It is as if the entire body of tort law were studied
as an answer to the question, "When should individuals be liable for their actions?" Such
a query would soon swallow up most of the modem curriculum. Moreover, the fact that a
corporation is at issue is surely of no moment. Antitrust, bankruptcy, criminal law, and
various regulated industries laws do not become corporation law for this reason. This last
point seems obvious, but it is important to recognize that the failure to cleave veil-
piercing completely from the study of corporation law has left students, scholars,
attorneys, and judges in search of a nonexistent and false doctrine. We have come far, but
not far enough.
B. The False Invocation of Equity
We remain suspicious that all this principled analysis has left a case here and there
to fall through the cracks. Therefore, the power to do justice is always reserved. Veil-
piercing is used, so we are often told, to reach the right result, or to prevent clever parties
(and their lawyers) from subverting the unstated but true purpose of incorporation.
Despite the fact that one of the corporation's central purposes is the limitation of liability
for the purpose of avoiding large obligations, 10 8 we obsess with the ability of the law (or
at least the judge) to do the right thing, lest cleverness prevail over justice.
This ability is usually invoked in the name of "equity" in veil-piercing cases. 109 This
part examines the two principal sources of equity power: the ability to fashion new
remedies, and the newer and wider-ranging ability to fashion new substantive rights.
1 10 I
submit that neither is a legitimate source of judicial power in these cases, and should be
abandoned by the courts.
However we might understand the Chancellor's practice today, it originated
primarily as the ability to provide remedies beyond that of money damages available in
the courts of law. The practice of equity, that is, the providing of new remedies for legal
rights, could lead to the characterization that it included the broad power to define new
107. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 25-27.
108. See id. at 16 ("The story most often told for limited liability in corporations emphasizes its importance
in facilitating large aggregations of funds to fuel the growth of industrial America.") (citing JAMES WILLARD
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at
28 (1970)); Thompson, supra note 3, at 1040.
109. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.5.1, at 70 (2000) ("Piercing is an equitable
remedy the court can impose in order to avoid injustice.").
110. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGEs-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §2.3(1), at 74 (2d
ed. 1993); 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 56-62 (Spencer W. Symons
ed., 5th ed. 1941).
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rights apart from those remedies.111 The Chancellor did in fact create new rights-for
example, the laws of trusts and mortgages. 1 12 But however broad and important, these
rights are exceptions, and "many persons are misled into the false notion that this
[correcting the law] is the real and peculiar duty of Courts of Equity in England and
America."'1 13 Thus, we have appealing but incorrect statements such as "equity, less
abashed by forms or fictions than a court of law, is more willing to draw aside the
[corporate] veil and look at the real parties in interest."1 14
There is nothing new about the remedy in veil-piercing cases. It is simply a money
judgment, one which could have been rendered by the pre-merger law courts. No further
rights or remedies are declared by the court. Despite the caption of veil-piercing or
corporate disregard, the corporation remains intact for all other purposes. 1 15 There is no
declaratory judgment, no injunction, no reformation, or other extraordinary relief. Veil-
piercing is about as "common law" as law gets.1 16
So, if veil-piercing is not equitable because of its remedy, what of the second part of
equitable power-the power to declare and define new substantive rights? Indeed, we
have received the maxim, among others, that "equity will not suffer a wrong without a
remedy."1 17 This is the genius of the law and is required in our judges, law or equity, lest
our rules become stale and moribund.11 8
But equally important is the means of exercise of this power. Equity, as well as law,
grows from settled principles, and adherence to them is necessary.11 9 If the growth is
based more on whim than doctrine, is it a legitimate evolution? All the scholars who have
decried the lack of content of the veil-piercing doctrine have recognized its illegitimacy.
If a judge determines that an individual should be liable for a corporate obligation, but
does not or cannot say why, there has been no expansion or adaptation of the law to new
circumstances. 12 0 Because the holding cannot be explained, analyzed, or replicated, it
adds nothing. We are left only to look at the facts and surmise the judge's reasoning, a
pursuit as fruitless now as it was when Frey recognized this almost fifty years ago. 12 1
111. 1 POMEROY, supra note 110, at 62.
112. See I DOBBS, supra note 110, § 2.3(2)-(3), at 75-81.
113. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 10 (W.H. Lyon Jr. ed., 14th ed. 1918).
114. Wormser, supra note 16, at 497.
115. See HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 256-57; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
116. See PRESSER, supra note 12, at 1-8.
117. 2 POMEROY, supra note 110, at 185.
118. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1881).
119. See 1 POMEROY, supra note 110, at 75-80. Pomeroy ultimately concludes that "it is impossible that
any new general principles [of equity] should be added." Id. at 80.
120. 1 DOBBS, supra note 109, at 117.
The absence of standards invites intuitive decisions which may yield unsuspected truths, but
may miss what structured analysis would reveal. ....
... Lawyers confronted with discretionary decisions get no guidance about appropriate
evidence and arguments, so one of the main advantages of rules and principles is missing ....
Id.; see also ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 182-83 (1921) (noting that the common law
provides both certainty and growth, but only when "reason, not arbitrary will is... the ultimate ground of
decision").
121. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
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Thus, we see that the discretion to create and define new substantive rights, whether
it be legal or equitable, has never been held to be a broad grant of arbitrary power, 122 but
rather, confined within the precedential system that post-merger equity courts now share
with the law courts. 12 3 The judge adheres in any case-legal or equitable-to precedents
and principles of decision, though modem equity is occasionally placed on some vaguely
delineated higher moral plane. 1
24
So what is there that modem equity can point to as a source for the power to pierce
the corporate veil? The primary source, according to the opinions, is that limited liability
is a privilege granted by the state, which "carries with it the responsibility to operate...
in accordance with the public interest." 12 5 This is an important theme underlying veil-
piercing cases, sort of a corporate noblesse oblige. This "privilege" argument has proved
durable and even appears to be enjoying resurgent popularity. 126 This is unfortunate
because the theory is illogical and incorrect, as I shall demonstrate.
It makes no logical sense to base veil-piercing in a theory of corporate privilege. All
commentators have recognized that an owner's failure to treat the corporation properly-
to follow formalities and the like-is never the cause of the plaintiff's injury. 127
Particularly in the case of tort plaintiffs, it is clearly undercapitalization that offends the
court. 128 Although it is often said that undercapitalization alone is not enough to pierce,
the additional factors can be composed of so much "make weight" that it is clear to a
critical reader of the opinions that it is undercapitalization that matters. The better way to
approach undercapitalization is to consider it as an explicit separate duty, apart from
corporate formalities and the like. This places the question where it belongs, as one of
tort law, not of corporation law. 129
But logic or illogic aside, whatever privilege that may have attached to corporations
or any other limited liability vehicles has disappeared. The scholars widely credited with
the first careful laying-down of veil-piercing analysis did so by beginning with the
question: when will it be appropriate to disregard the general rule of corporate limited
liability? This privilege was considered so remarkable to Wormser, 130 Cardozo, 13 1 and
122. Except perhaps in the earliest times, when the Chancellors were "either ecclesiastics or statesmen,
neither of whom are supposed to be very scrupulous in the exercise of power." I STORY, supra note 113, at 21;
accord I POMEROY, supra note 110, at 63-64 (describing the ecclesiastical and high moral setting of equity and
the individualistic approach of early chancellors).
123. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 110, at 83-84 ("Although equity developed other substantive rules, most of
these can best be considered in connection with particular substantive topics.").
124. See RALPH A. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 49 (1961) (concluding the
"ethical growth of the law" is now limited to actions for extraordinary remedies); id. at 5 (noting that "a moral
curtain, heavy with the mold of centuries" separates the main body of law from the "elevated moral principles
which we call equity").
125. PRESSER, supra note 12, § 1.02, at 1-10.
126. Id. § 1.02, at 1-12.
127. See, e.g., GEvURTZ, supra note 109, at 79-82; Hamilton, supra note 4, at 990 (concluding that "[a]
judgment against shareholders based on these activities, which are unrelated to the plaintiff's cldim, is a
windfall").
128. See GEVURTZ, supra note 109, at 91 (concluding from Thompson's empirical work, supra note 3, that
undercapitalization, when present, is very useful in predicting the outcome of the case).
129. See supra Part III.C.
130. See WORMSER, supra note 13, at 13-14.
131. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58,61 (N.Y. 1926).
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Powel 132 that its use should obviously be limited. Presser notes it is this "abuse of
privilege" concept that provides the main and best theoretical grounding for veil-
piercing. 133
What was special or unusual about the corporation in the early days of veil-piercing
has long since ceased to be so. Wormser listed six characteristics, which together drew a
bright line between a corporation and a partnership, such that the former was an object of
great privilege. 13 4 Those characteristics were: (1) perpetual life, (2) decentralized
management, (3) requirement of state acquiescence (a filing), (4) limited powers and
purposes, (5) limited liability, and (6) a separate legal existence from its shareholders. 135
But particularly, when the closely-held corporation is considered, as it is exclusively in
all veil-piercing cases, 136 modem scholars have recognized that none of these attributes
are hallmarks of the corporate form. A well-conceived partnership can have these
characteristics, and a corporation, conversely, can lack any of them, in any case as the
parties and the entity's creditors might so agree. 13 7 Furthermore, the number and types of
limited liability entities has expanded in the past few years with the LLC and its variants,
and state statutes require very little to be done to either create or maintain a corporation
or other limited liability entity. If there were some privilege involved here, any of these
things could be changed to make obtaining limited liability more difficult, but the trend is
in exactly the opposite direction.
Not only is most of the privilege gone, but more importantly, the search for abuse of
whatever privilege remains is a futile one. New entities can always be developed, and we
can manipulate existing ones. Lynn LoPucki has predicted the end of all liability as we
know it through the use of agreements and other arrangements which leave entities such
as corporations with no assets. 138 If he is right, we are simply rearranging the deck chairs
on the Titanic, 139 and if he is wrong, 140 clever debtors and creditors (and their lawyers)
will forever be in the chase. LoPucki shows clearly what happens as the chase continues,
as we search for juridical groups other than entities (such as corporations) to bear
liability. He states:
Liability, however, arises in an almost infinite number of contexts. Each would
present the same problem of definition. For the system to accomplish its goal of
enforcing liability, those who have it would have to know they have it. Only
then could they insure against it, or protect against the acts of others that might
impose it on them. Unless the stopping points were fixed on the basis of some
generalized principle rather than on ad hoc, industry-specific determinations,
132. See POWELL, supra note 15, § 1, at 2.
133. PRESSER, supra note 12, at 1-10.
134. See WORMSER, supra note 13, at 11-15.
135. Id.
136. Thompson, supra note 3, at 1047 ("Piercing of the corporate veil is limited to close corporations and
corporate groups (parent/subsidiary or sibling corporations).").
137. See HAMILTON, supra note 18, at 162-64. As to limited liability even without a filing, see Larry E.
Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 112-27 (1991).
138. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996).
139. This is LoPucki's imagery. Id. at4.
140. LoPucki's thesis has generated significant criticism and response. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1998); LoPucki, supra note 82.
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the problem of communication would be overwhelming. For participants in the
system, liability would seem to strike out of nowhere, and there would be little
they could do about it except to harden their own judgment-proof structures.
Without a generalizable principle for determining its stopping point, expanded
liability might lead to chaos. 1
4 1
There is thus little, if anything, left of any principled or doctrinal grounding of limited
liability as a privilege. There is simply nothing equitable about veil-piercing.
An interesting analogy exists when we consider the non-business parallel situation.
Are individuals ever permitted to conduct their daily lives with insufficient assets? They
are and they do. Are they ever held personally liable (to continue the corporate analogy)
beyond their individual assets? Not if they have heard about the discharge of debts
provided by the bankruptcy laws. It is instructive to examine when this veil of limited
individual liability is permitted to be pierced, that is, when individuals are denied a
discharge of debts in bankruptcy. The list of exceptions to the grant of a discharge is
short and simple: no more than once every seven years,142 and not for debts reflecting
what most of us would agree to be "culpable" conduct, such as fraud, intentional torts,
drunken and drugged driving. 14 3 Although Congress adds to this list occasionally, the list
remains short. And, importantly, it is a statutory list, not judge-made.
V. WHY THE FALSE DOCTRINE PERSISTS
Cases can be decided according to existing principled doctrine, without resort to an
ill-defined and illegitimate judicial power to do the right thing. We could have a
jurisprudence that is sound, manageable, and relatively doctrinal. 144 Why, instead of
clear analysis, has the empty and indefensible veil-piercing doctrine persisted for so
long? In order to determine what and who accounts for such robustness, we can consider
and ultimately dismiss all suspects, save one.
We cannot blame the plaintiff's lawyer; she is doing exactly what she is supposed to
do. If her client might prevail by incantation of a veil-piercing theory of liability, then it
would be malpractice not to do so. Such practices fall well to the permissible side of the
Rule 11 standards for non-frivolous claims. 14
5
141. LoPucki, supra note 138, at 71.
142. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8)-(9) (1994). Other subsections of § 727(a) prevent a debtor from receiving a
discharge under circumstances that suggest an analogy to the abuse of privilege argument, but those are directed
more specifically toward a fraud on the bankruptcy proceeding. See id. § 727(a)(3) (destroying or failing to
preserve records); Id. § 727(a)(4) (false testimony or withholding evidence); Id. § 727(a)(5) (unexplained
disappearance of assets); Id. § 727(a)(6) (failure to obey an order of the court).
143. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1994) (fraud or false statements); Id. § 523(a)(6) (willful and
malicious injury); Id. § 523(a)(9) (drunken or drugged driving resulting in death or personal injury); Id. §§
523(a)(4), 727(a)(2) (various types of fraudulent conduct). This is aside from the more generous discharge, that
is, a more sturdy veil, available under Chapter 13. See id. § 1328.
144. To those who would view the term "relatively doctrinal" as an oxymoron, I would postulate that
realists and doctrinalists can comfortably coexist. See. e.g., ARTHUR AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK:
OUTSIDERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER LEGAL EDUCATION 12 (1998).
145. Rule I I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a claim be "warranted by existing law or
by a non-frivolous argument for the extension . .. of exising law." FED. R. CIv. P. I I (b)(2). Veil-piercing may
be many things, but as "existing law" it is certainly firmly set. Given that Rule I I is usually read permissively,
there should be no problem here. See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
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We cannot blame the judge, who no doubt sincerely believes that the discretion
granted by the veil-piercing doctrine is exercised carefully and properly. Although some
have inveighed against judges for using words and doctrines without concrete and
objective meaning, 146 judges should not be expected to surrender discretion, especially
when precedent permits, if not encourages, its use. 147 The tension between adherence to
the rule of law and doing the right thing in an individual case is enduring in our
jurisprudence, and that it does and continues to press on judges should be no surprise. 14 8
We cannot blame the law students, because they are just doing what has been
modeled for them in law school. They are reviewing, compiling, and distinguishing the
cases in search of a "black letter" authoritative rule to quote and apply. This is what they
are taught to do, for the most part. There is probably some analytical criticism of the veil-
piercing theories given in their texts or by their professors or classmates, but they still
learn the doctrine. 14 9 No, the fault is within the academy. Both the curriculum and the
classroom are partly to blame. I will discuss each in turn.
The curriculum is partly to blame. Cases rarely use modem analysis because the
judges and attorneys shaping doctrine in briefs and opinions are unfamiliar with the
substantive law. Fraud is an unknown subject in law school. It is studied as a defense to
various actions in contract law, and similarly as an aside in many other courses, but rarely
is it a focus of careful study on its own. No wonder the term "fraud" is thrown about so
easily, or why opinions often say something "less than fraud" will be adequate to
pierce. 150 What of that something less than fraud? Constructive fraud, i.e., fraudulent
transfer law, is even more of a mystery. No student outside of the bankruptcy-savvy will
likely be familiar with the concept. This is a critical problem, as Clark surely has made
clear.15 1 Equity as an historical study is unknown, save for what remains in real property
and remedies. Thus, it is frequently, but improperly, invoked as a wholly discretionary
power of the court to right all wrongs. Finally, students are steeped in the litigation
tradition, more concerned with winning the case than establishing coherent doctrine.
AND PROCEDURE § 1335, at 70 (2d ed. 1990) ("[F]ederal courts have been quite tolerant of... theories as long
as they are not completely lacking in merit."); 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FED. PRACTICE §
11.11 [7][c] (3d ed. 1998) (noting that Rule 11 "is not intended to impede zealous or creative advocacy").
146. See RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM: THE AGENDA FOR REFORM 83
(1989) (arguing that, when courts fail to abide by objectivity where it exists, "[w]e are left to flounder in a sea
of surging subjectivity").
147. See GEVURTZ, supra note 109, at 72 (noting that use of a several-factor test "is a godsend to students,
litigants, and courts who recognize the weakness of reasoning by pejorative, but still wish to remain aloof from
analysis based on policy").
148. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 134-35 (1928); POUND, supra note
120, at 182-83.
149. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
150. The term "fraud" itself is
so vague that it requires definition in nearly every case. Further difficulty has been added by a
failure to distinguish the requisites of the action in tort at law from those of equitable remedies,
and to distinguish the different forms of misrepresentation from one another, and
misrepresentation itself from mere mistake. Any attempt to bring order out of the resulting chaos
must be at best a tentative one, with the qualification that many courts do not agree.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 62, at 727.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
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They spend more time in law school preparing for court than preparing to advise and
counsel business clients. Thus, they are not sensitized to the need for predictable rules to
aid them in what will, for most of them, be their daily practice outside the courtroom.
But the greater problem probably lies in the classroom. Curricular shortcomings
could be corrected if students were exposed to these substantive areas when veil-piercing
is discussed in their corporations class. How is veil-piercing presented to them? I suspect
that, for most of us, veil-piercing is fun and satisfying to teach. It gets the students not
only to demonstrate expertise in the traditional amalgamation of cases in the common-
law tradition, but also to question case holdings, get behind them to find the real reasons,
and be careful, critical thinkers. All this is good. We should expect this kind of more
advanced work from students beyond the first year. 152 However, the result will likely be
similar to that experienced when teaching legal capital rules, aptly summarized by
Manning and Hanks:
[S]tudents who have endured this experience fall into three groups. The first
group.., believes the subject is very real and very important. It is not. The
second group remembers that the end product was the instructor's analytic
devastation of the whole topic; this group sneers at the subject as trivial and not
to be taken seriously. Later, as lawyers, they will get a client and themselves in
trouble. The third group remembers only that the whole matter seemed terribly
complicated at the time, they didn't understand any of it, and they haven't
thought about it since. 153
The same could be said for teaching veil-piercing. Some students will remember
veil-piercing as a clear and certain rule. They have learned nothing. Some will remember
that the rule is flexible and seek to apply it, to find the alter ego or something like that
and do justice in the right situations. They will be haphazard and wrong as often as they
are right. Still others will remember the rule, recall that it has no analytical basis, and will
not be sure what to do with it. They have the most correct learning, but how have we
helped them be better lawyers? To ignore or make light of veil-piercing is dangerous. As
Manning and Hanks said, "The real problem is that the game is not worth the candle."
154
My proposed solution is to give students a grounding in the deconstructed old
doctrine and the better analysis which provides sound reasons for veil-piercing in nearly
every case. This must, of course, be supplemented with learning about law made by
judges and their reactions to facts, 155 and some appreciation of, yes, the emotions and
152. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 130-40 (1930)
(discussing the exhortation given to "up the stakes" in the second year).
153. BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, LEGAL CAPITAL 2 (3d ed. 1990).
154. Id. at2.
155. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 148, at 134. Cardozo stated:
[The jurist] will hope indeed that with study and reflections there may develop in the end some
form of calculus less precarious than any that philosopher or lawyer has yet been able to develop.
In the meantime, amid the maze of contingency and regularity, he will content himself as best he
can with his little compromises and adjustments, the expedients of the fleeting hour.
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sensibilities involved in each case. 156 The old doctrine must also be supplemented with
an examination of the different roles of the lawyer as advocate (seeking to win regardless
of the shambles made of doctrine, and rightly so) and the counselor (seeking the
predictability of sensible rules) and the effect each has on development of the rules. 157
We must teach the old learning, because it is precedent, for whatever it is worth, but it
must be sown with the seeds of its own destruction, and then all we can do is wait.
VI. CONCLUSION
The concept of veil-piercing has been shown to be empty but yet enduring.
Wormser's characterization of the whole subject as a "tempting but profitless
discussion" 158 has proved ominously accurate. There are better ways to teach, learn, and
apply the underlying concepts, to do the fundamental job of distinguishing among cases
to find those where it is proper for there to be recovery from individuals despite the
existence of the corporation or other new limited-liability entity. To do so, the keepers of
the academy must expose students to the old law with a new twist. Veil-piercing must be
taught as old doctrine and new, critical, better doctrine, with the hope that evolution will
do the rest. This should be appealing to all camps: it is at once doctrinal and realist, rule-
based and deconstructionist, analytical and critical. It will work, though the cleansing will
take a long time, because good lawyers and good judges will see the good sense of
coherent doctrine. Of course, the long run can be exasperating, and whether it will outlive
us all remains to be seen. But that the effort may seem at first to be to no avail is no
excuse-it is time to get started.
156. Of this, Llewellyn said early on that "we can do more; nay, we are doing more." LLEWELLYN, supra
note 152, at 140. For a recent example, see Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, "A (nother) Critique of Pure
Reason": Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1773, 1781-83 (noting the virtues and
necessity of returning consideration of emotions to the law school classroom).
157. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 152, at 71-72.
158. Wornser, supra note 16, at 496.
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